Saturday, 12 September 2015

IS PHILOSOPHY JUST A HOBBY?
Philosophers' Cafe September 9, 2015

The Meeting

This gathering, I thought, was extraordinary.  33 people attended, several for the first time.  My hopes for lots of interaction, sharing of ideas and stories, different points of view, and challenging questions were entirely fulfilled.  A great start to our new season.

My usual preliminaries included a couple of new initiatives for this year.  One is this blog which I hope all of you will use to take part in ongoing conversation about the topics of our meetings.  I will post additional essays from time to time about philosophical issues that I am interested in. My second new goal for the season is to conduct a group study of a book by Ken Wilber scheduled for publication later this year titled The Fourth Turning of Buddhism.

Instead of a formal talk, I began the discussion with a question:  “How many philosophers are in attendance this evening?”  Only a few hands went up, perhaps 5 or 6.  Nonetheless, most members had some good ideas about what philosophy is and what philosophers do.   Some of the ideas put forward in the ensuing discussion were:
  • Philosophy is about the meaning of existence.
  • Philosophers’ ask the Big Questions about life, ethics, and politics.
  • The word ‘philosophy’ means ‘love of wisdom.’  The ultimate goal of philosophical thought is wisdom or understanding.
  • Wisdom is the ability to apply knowledge appropriately to everyday situations.
  • Philosophy is an attitude built out of thoughts and feelings about our experience, a personal perspective on life.
  • Philosophy is more than a personal attitude; it seeks a universal perspective, insights and truths that can be accessed by anyone.
  • Philosophy may not have all the answers, but it has all the questions.  ‘Why’ questions seem to be part of human nature, as seen in very young kids.
  • The Serenity Prayer is a good example of a philosophy of life.
  • Academic philosophy too often obsesses about trivial issues that no one else is interested in.
  • Philosophical trends come and go, like fads in popular culture.
Clearly, for these thinkers, philosophy is not just an intellectual hobby.  It is also not just an academic specialty, as I will argue in a subsequent post.

In the second hour, I invited members to share stories about philosophical epiphanies they might have experienced in their earlier lives.  A philosophical epiphany is an insight or realization, occurring usually in a dramatic moment, that leads to a significant shift in the individual’s outlook on life or belief system.  I led with a story  of my own from my graduate student days.  At the time, despite having had considerable exposure to critical philosophy, I was still nominally committed to the orthodox Christian theology in which I had been raised.  Soon after the birth of my first daughter, it occurred to me in a flash of insight that this beautiful baby had come into the world entirely innocent, that the doctrine of Original Sin was not only false but pernicious, and that a benevolent God would not impose such a vile judgment.  That insight led quickly to the collapse of the entire edifice of religious belief I had imbibed from the Church of my youth.

My story was followed by a remarkable series of personal stories of transformation by other members of the group.  The honesty and trust conveyed in the telling of those stories was moving for everyone, I think.  Space issues prohibit my retelling of all of them (I don’t trust my memory to get them right anyway).  However, here are a couple of examples.  One member told of how, after losing both his wife and his daughter within a short period of time, he found within himself a source of resilience and strength to cope with his excruciating loss in a positive way.  Another told about a humiliating experience from the words of a cruel priest in a religion class she was forced to attend.  She was rescued by a group of other girls who rallied behind her and defended her openly before the priest, a lesson in the strength to be found in friendship.

I wrapped up the discussion by asking the group if, during these two hours, they had paid attention to what the others said, reflected on their ideas and stories, and related them to some extent to their own views.  Lots of head nodding.  Then I asked again, “How many philosophers do we have here tonight?”  Nearly everyone raised their hand, and rightly so.  It was a wonderful moment.


My comment

Transformational experiences like the ones I have described, when reflected upon over time, are usually unforgettable, and they often become part of a person’s outlook on life, part of their personal journey toward wisdom.  They can also become, for people who have an intellectual bent, occasions for philosophical reflection.  Loss of a loved one often triggers deep questions about the meaning of suffering, the existence of God, the awful reality of death.  Finding support and comfort from friends in a difficult time can lead to thinking about the nature of friendship in general and how to distinguish good friends from bad.  Reflecting deeply on experience is just what it means to do philosophy.  To develop the habit of reflecting deeply and critically on Big Questions is to make philosophy a way of life. In my next post, I will describe what a philosophical life looks like and argue that such a life is not an option solely for professional specialists in universities.  

* * * * 
I ended the evening with a quotation: 

     Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search of it when he has grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young alike ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it.

                   -  Epicurus of Samos, Greek Philosopher, 341-270 BC

Saturday, 5 September 2015

ON ABSOLUTE TRUTH
Last September’s Philosophers’ CafĂ© topic was “Truth and Its Enemies.”  As usual in discussions of this kind, a debate about absolutism vs. relativism occurred.  Are there absolute truths or are all beliefs/truth-claims merely relative to one’s culture or individual point of view?  Here are a few preliminary thoughts on the subject.  The short answer is yes, there are absolute truths, but my analysis won’t make absolutists very happy.
First, it's not clear whether the term 'absolute' adds anything to the concept of truth.  If a belief is true, isn't it absolutely true?  These days, people constantly use the word as a kind of emphatic substitution for 'yes.'  “Do you believe O.J. killed his wife?"  "Absolutely."  'Totally' is another one.  "Did you enjoy the concert?"  "Totally."  Perhaps in philosophy we can identify a more significant use of 'absolute' that might send our current inquiry off toward a more satisfactory understanding.  I'm not so sure.
What is the opposite of 'absolute truth' in our context?  We might think it's 'relative truth.'  What could that mean?  For one, it could mean that a given belief is peculiar to a particular culture, e.g. orthodox Jews believe they are God's chosen people.  When thinking about such examples, people often say, "Well, it's true for them."  Which is just another way of saying they believe it.  The opposite of this would be a belief that is true for everybody, meaning that it is something that everyone believes.  But that is not what people usually mean by an 'absolute truth.'  A belief shared by everyone might be wrong.
Religious dogmas, of course, are often expressed in absolutistic terms, but a claim by someone that the Bible or a Papal Bull contains absolute truths does not establish those doctrines as absolutely true.  They're just asserted as such with much "roaring and bawling," as philosopher Simon Blackburn puts it.
A more philosophically respectable notion of 'absolute truth' might refer to beliefs that cannot be wrong, that are true for all time - even in all universes - regardless of how many people accept them.  Are there such truths?  Absolutely(!).  Understood in their relevant contexts, I take the following to be examples of 'absolute' truths:
1.  Truths about my immediate experience here and now, e.g., I am seeing a computer screen before me.  Ok, I’m not always at my computer, so how can this truth be timeless.  It can’t, but there is a class of truths about me and my computer that avoids this objection.  The timeless version:  at time t, CM is seeing a computer screen before him, where t is a variable that stands for any particular time.  Many instantiations of this formal proposition, whether past or future are timelessly true.  (The present instantiation is ambiguous.)
2.  All truths about the past.  In the year 49 BC, Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon River on his way to Rome.  (Of course, that belief might be false, but if so some other statement will be true, e.g. it was in some other year that J.C. crossed the Rubicon or it was some other river, or even that J.C. never existed.)
 3.  All mathematical truths, e.g. the Pythagorean Theorem, at least when someone is thinking about it. 
4.  Many empirical generalizations, e.g. if you, a human constituted as all humans are at this time in history, step in front of a moving bus, you will be injured or killed.  (If you want to argue that this is only a highly probable truth and therefore not absolute, fine: state it as a probability and then that statement will be 'absolutely' true.)
It may be objected that my approach is just to throw a net over every kind of truth there is, leaving no room for an opposite to 'absolute truth' at all.  But that is my point - the term 'absolute truth' does not delineate a species of truth different from other kinds of truth.  The opposite of 'truth,' whether absolute or not absolute, is simply falsehood.  I propose dropping the term 'absolute' from this kind of discussion altogether.  Then we could get on with the really tough question:  what are the criteria of truth and falsity in beliefs?  
This is not to say there is no issue of relativism vs. non-relativism.  I am only suggesting that, because of the negative connotations of the word 'absolute,' a better way of formulating the issue would be in terms of, say,  'objective vs. relative.'  Thus, the question would be "Is objective truth about the world possible, or are all truth-claims merely relative to a person's culture or their own subjective belief system?"




Time: A Brief Consideration
“Time keeps flowing like a river,” (song lyric, The Alan Parsons Project)
This is probably how most people think about time. It’s real; it’s been flowing for billions of years; we move through time from birth to death; time flies; it waits for no one; sometimes it flows faster than at other times. Hold on a minute - if time flows, how fast does it flow? One minute per minute? One hour per hour? This is the kind of nonsensical question that alerted me years ago to the fact that time is not what people commonly think it is.
The ‘river of time’ is a metaphor for a feeling we have that something is carrying us through life. We assume it’s something we have or don’t have in certain quantities (“She has too much time on her hands.”) The sands of time are running out. We can waste it; we can use it productively. We can measure it with pendulum clocks, stopwatches, and atomic clocks. In short, people think time is a metaphysical reality. It began to flow with the Big Bang and just kept rollin’ along like “That Old Man River’ for almost 14 billion years to the present day, and it will keep on rollin’ along until the Great Heat Death of the universe some unknown billions of years in the future.
Some people think we exist “in time” just as we exist in space.  St. Augustine, for example, used this idea to contrast with the existence of God, who is eternal and therefore not in time.  This is to imagine time as a kind of ever-moving container or medium in which we live and move like fish in water.  The 'river of time.'  This kind of thinking is obsolete.
Thanks to Immanuel Kant, logical positivism, and postmodern philosophy, we can’t think about time that way anymore. Our perceiving and thinking are limited to experience and whatever time is, we have to discover its nature within experience.  One obvious experience to begin with is our perception of change and motion.  Weather changes; the moon and planets move around, as do animals and people in their environments.  From earliest days, humans found it necessary  to invent systems of measuring the flow of events for ordering their memories and planning for the future.  Solar, lunar, and seasonal cycles were used by ancient peoples as natural clocks ("It is 12 moons since our last hunt.")   

Later, sundials were succeeded by pendulums, analogue and digital watches, stop watches, and atomic clocks that are clearly measuring devices.  What do they measure?   "Time, of course." But when pressed to show where in the world time is, people resort to metaphysics.  "Well, it's hard to say exactly, but it's out there somewhere.  Hardly satisfactory.  Happily, there is no need to postulate some mysterious metaphysical ‘river of time’ for the answer.  We don’t use clocks to measure time.  We use them to measure change or motion or the duration of events that we observe in the physical world.  Just as we use rulers to measure the lengths of objects and thermometers to measure heat, we use clocks to measure the changes or movements of physical objects or processes in our experience. What was the winning time in the 3d race at Belmont?  From the starting gun to the finish, the stopwatch shows 3m 9s.  Sometimes we need smaller units like microseconds.  Sometimes larger -  years and centuries to measure really big changes like the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, the Thirty Years War, or the universe from the Big Bang to now.  
And that’s all time is, a system we invented to help us manage our lives in an ever-changing world. And there is more than one system, each constructed to serve a specific purpose in a specific context.  Our familiar 24-hour watch is splendid for getting us to meetings 'on time' but not for understanding the structure of the cosmos.  For that we need Einsteinian space-time.  What is the real time?  Depends on what you want to do.
Time, then, is an artifact, a social construction, a system of ordering and measuring change and for making predictions. This fact has some startling implications.  Since only humans create artifacts, it follows that time came into existence, not with the Big Bang, but only when our ancestors evolved into linguistic societies where farming and business required it, perhaps around 6000 years ago.  The Big Bang itself, being a social construct, a theory, did not exist before scientists thought of it, and those 13.7 billion years didn’t happen until cosmologists used math to calculate the number.
So, is time real? You bet – real in the same way all artifacts are real, as objects or systems devised by humans for their various purposes.  If you still think there is some other, metaphysical kind of time flowing along ’out there’ in the ’real world,’ then tell me what observation or experiment I should carry out in order to discover it.




Wednesday, 3 October 2012


PHILOSOPHY AND EVERYDAY LIFE
Summary and Comments on the
Philosophers' Cafe Meeting of September 12, 2012

A good way to begin each new season is to reflect at least briefly on the nature and spirit of philosophical thinking.  Although not all of our topics are strictly philosophical, we try to aim in our discussions for the deeper issues that lie beneath the surface.  Two years ago we tackled directly the question of what philosophy is.  That’s not an easy question, and even the experts do not always agree.  Here is a quick review.  There is nearly unanimous agreement at least on the following: 

Philosophy in our culture is not a body of knowledge or opinion, but the project of inquiring into the Big Questions of life using natural reason.  Its aims are truth and wisdom.  It operates in complete independence of religious or political authority.  Reason in philosophy performs two functions:

· Critical function:  philosophers use logic and conceptual analysis to challenge theories, assumptions, traditions, authorities, clichĂ©s, and dogmas of all kinds.

· Speculative function:  the attempt to organize facts and ideas into a coherent Big Picture or worldview that makes sense ourselves and the universe in which we live.  

· Answers in philosophy are not easy to come by, but to assist us in the search we have dialogue among friends and experts and a rich legacy of deep thought bequeathed to us by the great thinkers of ancient and recent times.

· People can and do get through life without much serious philosophizing, but no one can get along without philosophical beliefs.  We can take the easy path of non-thinking or we can make time to use the gift of reason to inquire about our given beliefs and thereby fulfill the aspiration of Socrates who urged us to live the examined life, because the alternative is not worth the effort.

Last night we took a more down-to-earth approach:  how might the events of everyday life give rise to philosophical questions?  My source was Breakfast With Socrates by Robert Rowland Smith, one of many contemporary thinkers who believe philosophy should be rescued from the ivory tower and made more accessible to the educated public at large.  The book takes us through the events of a typical day in the life of a citizen in a modern society, beginning with waking up, getting ready for the day, and proceeding through work, leisure activities, and ending with making love, falling asleep, and dreaming.  We spent most of our first hour with a discussion of Chapter 1:

“Waking Up”

If you were to sit down to breakfast with Socrates, he might ask if you realize what an astounding event has just occurred - you woke up!  Yes, it is the most ordinary, predictable, apparently unremarkable thing we do, but if we take even a minute to think about it, waking up must strike us as an surprising and mysterious event.  It is surprising, Smith says, because we never see it coming.  Prior to the wake-up, we were unconscious, perhaps dreaming, perhaps not - certainly not in any condition to plan for waking.  And if not at the switch, then who or where was I when I wasn’t around and how did I wake up?  I don’t know how I did that, and there is no guarantee that it will keep on happening when I want it to.  Who is this person that is now awake and active, now asleep and dreaming, and now seemingly nowhere at all?

Waking up challenges us to wonder about our very identity and the basis for our existence.   Last night I dreamt and now I am awake.  But am I really?  Is it possible, as Chuang Tzu mused, that I am not a person that dreamt he was a butterfly but rather a butterfly who is now dreaming he is a person?

The 17th century philosopher Rene Descartes wondered about this.  In an effort to discover a firm foundation for all knowledge, he tried to find a way to be absolutely certain that he was not dreaming or otherwise deceived during his waking, thinking hours.  Aha!  Thinking - there’s the key.  As long as I am thinking, he wrote, I can be certain of my existence.  Cogito, ergo sum.  So now we have breakfast with Socrates and Descartes, but the fun is just beginning.

Our author, Robert Rowland Smith, goes on in his first chapter to bring in Jesus Christ, the artist Stanley Spencer, Shakespeare, Hegel, and others to probe the web of relationships among sleep, waking, consciousness, life, death, resurrection, and truth.  Among the insights offered was a reference to the many metaphors in our language that use the notion of waking up. We speak of “waking to the truth,” we urge others to “wake up and smell the roses,” we talk about how something finally “dawned on us.”  9/11 was a “wake-up call.”  Spiritual sages teach us how to awaken from our primal delusions.  Could it be that the great cultural transformations of human history have been a process of struggling to wake up from our “dogmatic slumbers” (Immanuel Kant)? 

As you can see, a simple predictable occurrence of everyday life can trigger for us a host of intriguing associations of ideas about life, death, identity, consciousness, and truth.  And that’s not all.  We haven’t said anything about the challenge of waking up, the values dimension.  Ok, I’m awake, but what now?  Am I glad I woke up?  Should I get out of bed?  Is the day that awaits me likely to be worthwhile?  Maybe I should stay put.  Do I really have a choice or will I be forced to get up by internal and external forces?

Of course, it would be absurd for us to turn every act of waking up into a philosophical workout, especially before breakfast,  but would our lives not be made richer by giving ourselves the time later to reflect on these everyday matters in order to attain a deeper understanding of this existence of ours?  Fortunately, we don’t have to start from scratch.  There are plenty of good thinkers around to help us make philosophy a part of our everyday lives.  You can make a great beginning with Rowland Smith’s delightful little volume.  Breakfast With Socrates - what a way to start the day!

Why do usually moral people find it so easy to commit immoral acts?

This was the first question raised in our second hour.  Rick Rogers wonders why people who are not habitual criminals or psychopaths or moral morons so often do things that are clearly wrong.   People will cheat on exams, drop litter on parking lots, avoid taxes, fail to return a wallet, say nothing if a clerk gives them too much change at the check-out, and so on.  Why is that so easy for usually well-behaved, honest citizens? 

Answers ranged from “People don’t think they will be caught” to “They don’t agree with the rule or law” to “The breakdown of cultural norms in modern mass societies has a lot to do with it.”  People are good at rationalizing their actions so that they become blind to their wrongness.  At bottom is our inherent tendency to be self-centered.  Moral laws and norms are invented by societies, not hardwired in the brain by genetic coding.  When no one is looking, self-interest may easily side with the imp in its argument with our good angel. 
The deepest question that arose out of the discussion is whether it is rational to be moral at all.   Socrates was confronted with this challenge by the Myth of the Ring of Gyges.  Isn’t it foolish to pass up an opportunity to do wrong, even great wrong, when we stand to benefit and the odds of getting caught are low or nil?  The standard answer is that to act morally in most cases is sensible from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest and the general good, which most people care about.  But most of us think the demands of morality go beyond this rather flaky position.  We think to be a moral person requires integrity, consistency, obedience to our standards even when no one is looking, with allowance made for exigent (rare) circumstances.
Why should we live a moral life thus conceived?  A moral answer to the question “We should always do the right thing because it is the right thing to do,” would be circular and therefore useless.  So the challenge would be to provide a non-moral reason for acting morally.  Can that be done?  That’s a question best left for another meeting.
 Can we talk about aesthetics?
This was the third question of the night, brought forward by Herb Spencer in cahoots with artist Bob Michener.  The two of them had discussed the issue earlier and reached agreement that we cannot.  Hang on.  We need to carve this up a little bit.  Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy that constructs and evaluates theories about the nature of art and beauty, and the basis for judgments of taste.  Thinking and debating about the arts have been carried on at least since Plato in the West, so obviously it is possible to talk about aesthetics in some important sense. 
Turns out our aesthetes were willing to admit that we can talk about certain aspects of art - visual form, say, characteristics such as proportion, perspective, technical skill, artistic use of line, shadow, musical harmony and structure, perhaps others.  To these I would add interpretation.  Although art lends itself to considerable latitude for interpretation - think of the many critical takes on Hamlet - some interpretations are clearly wrong (Hamlet is not a romantic comedy), and therefore some are right or at least more plausible than others, and so we can talk about them.
The problems flagged by our question lie in the direction of judgments about the quality of an artwork and the subjective response of the art “consumer.”  One claim is that the sole arbiter of a work’s value is the market.  True, but value is not the same as quality.  Can we talk objectively about the quality of a painting or musical composition?  Isn’t beauty or appreciation in the eye of the beholder?  Can we talk in any meaningful way about the ineffable feeling of the sublime that a refined sensibility may experience - not without considerable investment of time, effort, and attention - in the studied presence of a great painting or when enraptured by the famous aria in Aida?  Perhaps not with any great success, but at least we know - from the testimony of the starry-eyed few who have been there - that transcendent aesthetic experiences are possible.  And that is good to know.
Thanks to everyone who contributed to a very lively discussion and to everybody for thinking.

Wednesday, 28 December 2011

MUST ART BE BEAUTIFUL? PART II

Even the ancient Greeks with their sublime standards of proportion, harmony, and otherworldly perfection, passed down images and stories of ugly and frightening creatures, both human and non-human. The grotesque and horrific entered Christianity in the Book of Revelation, scenes from which became favorite subjects for such later artists as Hieronymous Bosch, Albrecht Duhrer, and Fra Angelico. Hell, the Devil, and St. Anthony's temptations (hard to look at for very long) were favorite themes. Ugliness, like beauty, experienced numerous changes in fashion over the centuries, now displayed in the images of old women, now in dwarves and corpses, and often in frightful images of dragons, mythical beasts, and monsters of all kinds. In the modern era, the ugliness of industrial cities and the deformed people who inhabit them find expression on the canvases (and on movie screens!) of artists usually admired for less disturbing works, as well as some who seem to be ugliness specialists.

Judgments of ugliness, like those of beauty, are ultimately subjective, and Aristotle may find some support for his claim that the skill of a great artist can render beautiful an ugly object. However, I am inclined to the view of Umberto Eco (On Ugliness, 2007) who asserted there are some realities that no one can render pleasant by any philosphical maneuver or aesthetic rationalization. A few moments with Salvador Dali's Soft Construction With Boiled Beans (Premonition of Civil War) is probably all you will need to see his point. When artists painted or sculpted images of demons or severed limbs or the unadorned human genitalia or a pile of trash, they knew their subjects are ugly, they intended their works to reflect that ugliness, and they would likely be put off by anyone who did not react to them with revulsion or horror.

In the vast catalogue of ugly works of Western art, there are virtually no depictions of ugly landscapes other than those that have been destroyed or desecrated by human beings. Almost all the images of ugliness are of humans or creatures that bear enough resemblance to humans that we cannot behold them without self-reference. What are we to make of this? We find a clue in Friedrich Nietzsche's dictum that what we humans hate above all is the deformation of our own kind. Ernest Becker (Denial of Death, 1973) nailed the point precisely, I think: for us the body is always an existential problem. The evolution of the psyche from an infantile identification with bodily sensations through various stages of dawning self-consciousness brings us finally to a fully realized ability to contemplate ourselves and our situation as embodied, finite beings whose universal destiny is decline, disease, old age, and death. Our reaction is painfully split: on the one hand we yearn for liberation from this decaying flesh and for the perfection of the gods, while on the other we know perfectly well that without our ambiguous embodiment there can be no experience of truth, of love, of beauty, or indeed of anything like life as we have come to know it.

If beauty is truth, as Keats wrote, then, as artists of all eras seem to insist, ugliness is also truth.   In this ultimately mysterious universe, beauty and ugliness are, equally, fundamental elements of the order of things and of our own being.

     - C. Marxer

Friday, 16 December 2011

MUST ART BE BEAUTIFUL?

The simple answer is "No," as will be readily understood by anyone who has heard the music of Metallica or seen any pictorial representation of the temptations of Saint Anthony.  Of course, we could always deny that heavy metal music is art, a move that exposes just one of the complexities involved in our topic question.  What counts as art?  What is beauty?  What is the opposite of beauty?  If some art is not beautiful, how are we to characterize it?  Only the last of these is directly relevant to our topic, so I propose to begin with a set of orienting principles that, if not self-evident, are so widely shared as to provide an acceptable platform from which to begin our inquiry.

1.  The term art can be suitably applied to any deliberately created  product of the human      imagination.  This definition makes room for children's art, folk art, and decorative crafts, but excludes dreams and  the elegant trails left by sidewinders slithering across desert sands.   It also excludes the nifty nests of bower birds, although if someone  insists on making a case for them, I won't contest the point.
 
2.  Aesthetic judgment - a claim that an object is beautiful or not - is a  prerogative of rational beings.

3.  We call a work of art beautiful when it occasions in us a high degree of  pleasure.

4.  One thing can be more beautiful than another.

5.  The judgment of taste is about the beautiful object, not about the  subject's state of mind.     (#3, 4, and 5 are from R. Scruton, A Very Short  Introduction to Beauty).

6.  Shared agreement about what is beautiful and what is not is common  both within and across different cultures, along with lots of  disagreement. 

Given these initial ideas, our task is to attempt to make a case, either for or against the proposition that art must be beautiful.  Metallica and St. Anthony provide an easy first answer, but a more careful look reveals some interesting subtleties.  James Joyce distinguished proper from improper art.  The latter refers to works that tend to arouse some kind of desire in the experiencer.  Examples include pornography, didactic and propagandistic art.  Art is proper when it is experienced without any inclination to possess its subject or to perform some action.  In that opinion, Joyce agrees with other thinkers, such as philosopher Roger Scruton and historian Umberto Eco.  The idea is that the experience of beauty is disinterested appreciation - contemplation of a beautiful object solely for the delight, pleasure, joy, or spiritual feeling it evokes in us.

It is not clear from the above that Joyce would claim that only proper art is beautiful, but we can be pretty certain he would say that a lot of improper art is not beautiful.  He would find lots of takers for that position.  We can add a number of particulars to his broad category: boring art, poorly executed art, most children's art, raw sketches, doodles, and conceptual art (20th century) come to mind.  There may be others, but I think the most fascinating opposite-to-beauty is ugliness.  It may come as a surprise to many people to learn that alongside the history of beauty is a history of ugliness in art that is equally compelling, although in a different way.

Since earliest times, artists have not hesitated to portray ugliness in its many forms: the deformed, the chaotic, the disgusting, the monstrous, the diabolical, the terrifying, the  gory, etc.  Tender-minded philosophers like Plato and Marcus Aurelius have tried to avoid the reality of ugliness in various ways, but the persistent attention to ugliness by artists throughout the ages makes for a strong case that ugliness is not merely the absence of beauty but that, in art, it delivers powerful symbols of a dark component of reality itself. 

In Part 2 of this essay, I will explore in greater detail the concept of ugliness in art.

   - C. Marxer








Friday, 11 November 2011

WAS JESUS A SUBVERSIVE?

Jesus of Nazareth seems an unlikely candidate for the label "subversive."  The most reliable writings about him that we have (the Gospels of Mark and Luke together with another source, Q, which Mark and Luke used) portray him as an itinerant preacher who urged his followers to repent of their sins, embrace a life of voluntary poverty and virtue, and prepare themselves for the imminent appearance of God's kingdom on earth.  The latter is of special importance for understanding Jesus's mission and teachings.  Jesus was a Jewish apocalypticist, a proponent of an ideology that saw the world as under the sway of evil powers.  A Messiah sent by God would sweep away the evildoers and establish a new order of peace and godliness.  In Jesus's version, the world as then known would soon come to an end, a day of judgment would separate the good from the wicked, and new earthly rulers, presumably his disciples, would preside over the new Kingdom of Heaven. 
There was nothing particularly unusual in his message; a number of prophets before him, including John the Baptist, whom Jesus knew personally, had called the Jewish people to repent and prepare for an imminent catastrophe.  Still, the Romans put Jesus to death as a troublemaker, so they may have seen something subversive in his preaching.  What might that have been?

A subversive is someone who works to undermine a regime or an established political order.  It is natural, therefore, to understand our topic as the question of whether Jesus was a political subversive.  However, it is possible, with a little semantic license, to consider whether he might have been subversive in other ways, which I will mention later in this essay.

It is not easy to make the case for Jesus as a political subversive.*  He does not seem to have been interested in the Romans at all, advising his followers to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's."  An apolitical attitude would make sense for someone who expected the world to end within a generation.  God would deal with the Romans.  His
sermons were all about the coming of the new Kingdom and what the Jewish people should do now to ensure God's favor at the end of days.  Also, there is no evidence that Jesus tried to organize some clandestine organization devoted to overthrowing the Romans or even the Jewish king. 

Nevertheless, near the end of his life when he entered Jerusalem at the time of the Passover, something happened to bring him under the suspicion of the Roman procurator. The authorities were always on edge during Passover, a time of great crowds in the city and not infrequent protests and sometimes even uprisings.  It seems that Jesus's enemies among the prominent Jewish factions of the time saw an opportunity to get rid of him.  His betrayer, Judas, may have told the Romans that he had been fomenting rebellion.  In any case, when Jesus failed to deny before Pilate that he claimed to be King of the Jews, his fate was sealed.  The Romans never hesitated to crucify anyone who appeared to threaten their authority. 

We can be quite certain, therefore, that Jesus was not a political subversive.  However, his adversaries among the religious authorities did not appreciate his criticisms of them and some of his interpretations of God's will, Jewish law, and traditional practices - his theology in other words.   They also felt threatened by his ideas about the evils of wealth and the blessedness of the poor, the meek, and the oppressed. Jesus advised breaking up families, if necessary, and even suggested that marriage was pointless, given that the world was soon to end.  If such radical ethical notions gained wide acceptance, they would change the very fabric of society.  So, if Jesus was not a political subversive, as I have argued, is it plausible to think of him as a theological subversive, an ethical subversive, or a social subversive?

I leave those questions open for any readers who might wish to bring them into the discussion.
______________
     * For a novelistic attempt at this project, see King Jesus by Robert Graves, available from Amazon. 
        
      - C. Marxer

Thursday, 20 October 2011

ETHICS AND POVERTY, PART II

Jesus of Nazareth was asked by a rich man what he should do to gain the Kingdom of Heaven.  Jesus told him to sell all his possessions, give the money to the poor, and he would have treasure in heaven (Matthew 19:21).  Some critics of Peter Singer's Principle of Benevolence have charged that he advocates the same degree of self-sacrifice, only in our day not for laying up treasure in heaven but for gaining the satisfaction of knowing that we have fulfilled our duty or avoiding feelings of guilt if we failed to do so.  Such a standard, of course, would require many morally serious persons to reduce their standard of living, if not to quite to a subsistence level, then at least to a level far below the affluence that most of us enjoy in our over-developed societies.
Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters. Of course, mitigating circumstances can be adduced - for instance, that if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall be less effective than we would otherwise have been. Nevertheless, when all considerations of this sort have been taken into account, the conclusion remains: we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance. This conclusion is one which we may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our ordinary standards of behavior. Since most people are self-interested to some degree, very few of us are likely to do everything that we ought to do. It would, however, hardly be honest to take this as evidence that it is not the case that we ought to do it.  ("Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 1972)
One might object that there are many worthy causes that demand our attention: human rights, improving education, empowering women, etc.  If one is contributing to one or more of these causes, is she not fulfilling the Principle of Benevolence, even if none of her money goes to famine relief?  I think Singer's answer would be "Yes, but the need for food, shelter, and medical aid is more fundamental - necessary for the sustaining of life itself - than the aims of other benevolent activities.  Therefore at least some portion of our giving should go towards relieving hunger."  This seems correct to me.  Basic needs should be given priority over higher level needs.  Besides, campaigns for justice or education need not be abandoned altogether, because, we are told, there is enough wealth in the world to alleviate hunger without depriving humanity of everything else that's good or desirable in life. 

We are so used to thinking of giving as charity rather than duty, that many people will insist there must be something wrong with the argument, but Singer points out that the duty of benevolence has not always seemed so outlandish.  Thomas Aquinas claimed that food withheld belongs to the hungry, the clothes in your closet to the poor, and your savings to the penniless.  One of Islam's Five Pillars of religious obligation is to contribute 2.5 % of one's income to people in need.  Still, there are problems with Singer's specific claim that we have an obligation to contribute money to NGO's that feed starving people in foreign countries.

One is that we have no assurance that money contributed will achieve the results intended.  There may be an inverse relationship between the distance separating the contributor from the beneficiary and the actual benefit received.  NGO's have travel expenses, salaries to pay, and other overhead.  Often bribes must be paid to corrupt officials to get aid to the regions that need it.  Sometimes the food itself is stolen by a corrupt government or guerilla army.  Besides, there are plenty of hungry people in our own society.  It is estimated that in the U.S. 25% of children nationwide go hungry every day.  It would likely be more effective to donate money or even food directly to local organizations such as food banks. 

Another quite serious issue is whether the deeper problem might be population growth.  As long as poorer countries continue to produce large families, so the argument goes, providing food aid just postpones the inevitable in the long run.  Perhaps it is more humane to let one person die now than have 100 die in the future.  This seems harsh, but Singer grants the argument serious weight.  He says that if people come to the carefully considered opinion that population is the underlying problem, then they should contribute to organizations that are working towards rational population policies in developing countries.  Either way the Principle of Benevolence is fulfilled.

Short of rejecting the Principle of Benevolence outright, which would amount to abandoning the Moral Point of View, I do not see a way of avoiding at least a minimal version of Singer's conclusion, viz. that everyone who has the means ought to contribute something to relieve the hunger and destitution of strangers.  Are we unwilling to give up our weekly restaurant meal, pass on buying the latest version of the iPod, or earmark a percentage of our stock dividends for famine relief?  Then let us be honest with ourselves: we are not the moral paragons we have always thought ourselves to be.

     - C. Marxer

Friday, 14 October 2011

ETHICS AND POVERTY, Part 1


Do We Have a Moral Obligation to Help Strangers in Need?

Few among us can look at images of starving African children without feeling a pang of compassion.  Many people feel compelled to do something about human misery abroad, whether by working directly on the ground with an aid organization or by contributing money.  Conventional opinion in the affluent countries of the world calls such efforts charity.  Not Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University.  In a widely read 1972 article and in his recent book The Life You Can Save, Singer argues forcefully that we have a duty to do something to alleviate the suffering of people in countries like India and Somalia who are starving and who lack access to clean water and basic medical services.  If sound, his argument erases the distinction between charity and obligation and would lead to drastic changes in our way of life if we put his conclusion into practice.

High marks to Singer for courage.  Objections have been many and loud: charity begins at home, why should I give up my hard-earned wealth for strangers, giving will create a culture of dependency, aid organizations are self-serving, aid money is often stolen, if people are destitute it's their own fault, third-world people have too many children, poverty can't be eliminated, we are prisoners of our selfish genes, etc.  Some of these ring rather hollow, others deserve serious consideration.  However, the best way to get a handle on a complicated and compelling issue like this one is to render our protagonist's argument as strong as possible and then hold it up to the light of careful philosophical analysis.  That will be my approach in this essay.

First, Singer opens the exit door for anyone who does not take the Moral Point of View.  The moral point of view is an orientation to life based on the conviction that when making decisions that affect other people, their interests (desires, needs) must be taken into consideration.  People who take the moral point of view I call morally serious persons.  Psychopaths, moral relativists, and unredeemably self-centered individuals have no place at the table.  Given that context, Singer's argument can be set forth as follows:

1.  The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of ourselves, our families, and even our society.

2.  Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.

3.  If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it; it is a moral obligation.

4.  Most of us can do this because we frequently spend money on things we don't need.

Therefore, we should donate money to alleviate dire suffering in Africa and other poor regions of the world.

The importance of Premise 1 cannot be overstressed.  If you consider yourself a morally serious person, and most of us do, then you must be prepared to accept that basic human needs are the same everywhere and should be given equal consideration.  The fact that a needy person lives in a distant land has no moral importance whatsoever.  There may be grounds for looking after friends, neighbors, and fellow Canadians first, but they are not self-evident.  Where the need is greatest, other things being equal, is where our moral attention should be directed.

Premise 2 will be confirmed by anyone who is not entirely bereft of common sense, so on to Premise 3, which is the critical step in Singer's argument.

There is widespread agreement among people of most cultures that everyone should avoid doing harm whenever possible.  Call that the Harm Principle.  It flows almost automatically from the Moral Point of View.  Singer's Premise 2 goes beyond that maxim, claiming that we have an additional basic duty  to prevent harm or relieve suffering whenever possible.  This is usually called the Benevolence Principle.  It does not enjoy the same consensus.  Most people will agree that we should pull a drowning person out of the water if doing so does not threaten our life, and we would condemn someone who refused to do so because the water would ruin his business suit.  In Singer's terms ruining a suit is not "sacrificing something of comparable moral importance" to the life of a stranger.

However, beyond obvious cases of that sort, the argument is harder to make for Singer's strong version of the Benevolence Principle.  It is also harder to take.  It implies that many of the purchases we make, such as dining out at restaurants, buying new clothes every few months, upgrading from a 27-inch tv to a 46-inch flatscreen, etc., are morally wrong.  Singer is relentless about this, and I see no easy way to refute the argument.  When others are starving, how do I justify trading in my one-year-old car for a new one?   If we are unwilling to sacrifice self-indulgent purchases like these and share our discretionary income with others in dire need, then should we not at least be honest with ourselves and admit that our purchasing decisions are often immoral?

Perhaps most reflective people contribute money now and then to assist people harmed by epidemics or other natural disasters.  Not enough and not often enough.  Over 900 million people in the world do not have enough to eat.  So what would be enough?  Singer recommends 5% of annual income, provided that level does not require us to sacrifice anybody else's need for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care (including our own, of course).  Too harsh a standard?  Well then, as in the famous joke, we are now haggling about the price. 

So far I have tried to show that some version of the Benevolence Principle must be embraced by all morally serious persons.   However, I also stated above that Singer's version of the Benevolence Principle is harder to defend than the Harm Principle.  In Part II of this essay, I will elaborate on that view, particularly as Singer applies his principle to situations of starvation and other dire needs in the poor countries of the world.







Wednesday, 12 October 2011

LIBRARY RESOURCES FOR PHILOSOPHERS

Books Received by the Library for the
White Rock Philosophers Cafe, 2009-2011 

Ernest Becker, Denial of Death.
Roger Scruton, Beauty.
Michael Philips, The Undercover Philosopher.
Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein, Plato and a Platypus Walk Into Bar: Understanding Philosophy Through Jokes.
______Heidegger and a Hippo Walk Through Those Pearly Gates (more phil. and jokes)
Robert Wright, The Evolution of God.
Cynthia Stokes Brown, Big History: From the Big Bang to the Present.
Simon Critchley, The Book of Dead Philosophers.
Marietta McCarty, How Philosophy Can Change Your Life: 10 Ideas That Matter Most.
Alain de Botton, The Consolations of Philosophy.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind
Marci McDonald, The Armageddon Factor.
Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit.
Henry Jacoby, House and Philosophy: Everybody Lies.
Bart Ehrman, God’s Problem. (How the Bible fails to answer the problem of suffering.)
Lee Alan Dugatkin, The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for the Origins of
Goodness.
Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization.
Naomi Klein, No Logo.
Chris Hedges, Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle.
John Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor

DVD COURSE

Ideas of the Great Philosophers,  by Prof. Daniel N. Robinson, 60 lectures, 30 minutes each.
 
 

Thursday, 22 September 2011

PHILOSOPHY, LAUGHTER, AND HUMOR, PART II

Laughter might be the strongest indication of a Cosmic Spirit operating in the universe.  The central feature of comic experience, as I wrote earlier, is cognitive disengagement.  In the moment of enjoying a joke, a spontaneous one-liner, or a scene from a comedy, there is nothing going on other than pure amusement.  We are, in a way, standing outside of our normal selves, having no agenda, intending no action, surrendering all control, suspending all desires; instead occupying a viewpoint of choiceless yet playful awareness of some unexpected aspect of existence and bursting forth with the staccato sounds that could easily be understood as laughter at the entire universe.  In such moments, what is there that is not absurd?  The comic viewpoint is not even personal:  who is that laughs?  There is just that laughter, emanating from nowhere in particular and so, in principle, accessible to any rational creature that allows itself to surrender all shred of self-regard and practical concern to the pure enjoyment of a crack in the normal, tedious order of things.  Perhaps that is why laughter is contagious.  Start one person laughing, and often everyone will be laughing even if they missed the original joke.*  The comic viewpoint, therefore, is also the cosmic viewpoint, that of the Laughing Buddha, the pure but penetrating Witness to the absurdities of existence.

Of course, not everything is funny.  We can joke about death in the abstract, as in Woody Allen's quip, "I'm not afraid of death.  I just don't want to be around when it happens."  But we do not, perhaps cannot, laugh at the death of any particular person.  The bell tolls for us, too, and the image of ourselves in a casket is not usually a trigger for amusement.  Social norms also impose constraints on humor.  We call jokes about the disabled "sick."  Joking about bodily functions is frowned on in polite company.  Poking fun at a religion may earn you a fatwa.  Are some forms of humor morally wrong? 

Most current philosophical thinking on this question centers on racist and sexist jokes.  At our September 14 meeting, I told this one:

Q:  How does a passerby dissuade a group of black guys from gang raping a teenage girl?
A:  He throws them a basketball.
Most people laughed at this at first, but the laughter was followed immediately by some groans and grimaces.  People who are not racists do not feel comfortable with jokes like this, even though we cannot help but laugh at them.  Is that wrong?  Should we train ourselves not to laugh at such jokes?  Is it wrong to tell racist jokes?  Always, no matter what the circumstances?  It is not easy to answer these questions in any thoughtful way.  In his book Jokes: Philosophical Thinking About Joking Matters, Ted Cohen interrogated himself from a dozen or more angles in search of a moral theory that would show that such joking is wrong.  Eventually he gave up and advised his readers to hang on to their negative feelings, if they need to, but not to lie to themselves about whether the jokes are funny - they are.

There are two aspects to examine here: the telling of the joke and the enjoyment of it, the amusement.  First, the amusement.  Some people think it's wrong to laugh at jokes that demean minorities or ethnic groups or even an entire gender.  I suppose we could train ourselves to be super-alert for such joking and stifle our laughter the moment we sense one coming our way.  But most of the time we don't worry about this.  If a questionable joke is told, we laugh, maybe groan and wag our finger at the joke-teller, and move on - but we enjoyed the joke.  Is our amusement wrong?  This question reminds me of the long-running debate among moral philosophers about the intrinsic value or disvalue of pleasure derived from evil acts.  A sadistic Nazi prison guard, for example, enjoyed brutalizing Jewish inmates.  His actions were reprehensible, but must we also say that the pleasure he derived from performing them is evil also?  Tough question.  Considered in themselves, pleasures seem to admit only of degrees of intensity but not of qualitative differences that would make a moral difference.  If the Nazi guard could experience the same pleasurable feelings by watching a violent movie, would we have the same objection to his enjoyment?

Similarly, it is not clear that enjoying a racist or sexist joke is wrong or bad in itself.  If you think it is, what moral principle or theory brings you to that conclusion?  Am I a racist if I laugh at the joke about the blacks guys and the basketball?  Not necessarily.  Can I enjoy the joke and still disapprove of the negative stereotyping that it presupposes?  I don't see why not.  Do such jokes incline me to believe the stereotypes?  Certainly not, just as jokes about God do not cause me to believe that God exists and does foolish things.  John Morreall argues that jokes do not make claims or assertions at all.  Joking is a form of play; it is, let us recall, disengaged from all cognitive or practical concerns.  We should not be bothered if a joke consists entirely of wild fantasies or falsehoods about anybody or anything.  To joke is to play with ideas and when the play works, the appropriate response is amusement.

So the mere enjoyment of jokes seems to have no moral significance in itself.  The telling of jokes, on the other hand, is a different matter.  As Morreall points out, making a habit of joking at serious matters may lead us to disengage too often, to become cynical and irresponsible.  Laughter at someone's suffering or disaster also can block compassion and morph into outright cruelty.  Some people claim that racist and sexist humor promotes prejudice.  That may be true, although it is not clear how joking might do that.  It is sometimes said that joking aestheticizes serious issues, which has the effect of depriving them of their due seriousness.  Certainly racist and sexist humor do nothing to weaken prejudice, and our common sense intuition that it may reinforce socially harmful attitudes seems like a pretty good reason not to indulge in it.
                                 _________________________________________________

When I first began to research this topic, I was surprised to discover what a rich subject for philosophical investigation it is.  Humor has usually been thought of as a minor aspect of human life, perhaps an object of some psychological interest, but philosophy is serious business and can't be bothered to dwell for very long on the silly side of life.  This attitude has changed in the last hundred years or so, and the literature on the philosophy of humor has become quite extensive.  Naturally, such works are sprinkled with lots of examples of jokes and cartoons, so they make for enjoyable reading.  I hope this brief and woefully inadequate introduction to the topic will lead you to sample some of the literature.  I recommend especially the books by Cathcart and Klein - listed at the end of Part I of this essay.  Contrary to the widespread view that philosophy and comedy dwell on different planets, the authors of Plato and a Platypus Walk Into a Tavern and Heidegger and a Hippo Walk Through Those Pearly Gates demonstrate not only that philosophers can recognize and enjoy humor and use it for teaching philosophy, but also that some of them are pretty accomplished jokesters themselves. 

Many people would sooner die than think.  In fact, they do so.         
                                                                               - Bertrand Russell
 
 
* Many years ago, I attended a meditation retreat in Vancouver led by Joshu Sasaki, Zen Master of Mt. Baldy Zen Center in California.  During the ten days he spent at our center in Vancouver, he decided his students were becoming all too serious about their practice.  So he instructed us to gather in the zendo early in the morning before meditation and laugh.  After experiencing some awkwardness at first, we soon learned to do this easily, one person initiating the laughter - sans benefit of any joke - the others joining in soon after.  Before long we were all doubled over and slapping our knees, laughing at ourselves, at nothing, at everything.



 












Friday, 16 September 2011

PHILOSOPHY, LAUGHTER, AND HUMOR

Welcome to the White Rock Philosophers' Weblog!

The blog gives participants and followers of the White Rock Philosophers' Cafe an opportunity to continue the discussions we hold at our monthly meetings. Our rationale is that often we take away from the meetings a sense of non-completion. There always seems to be more about the topic we would like to explore and do so with others. The main feature is a summary essay that I post a few days after each meeting. As a follower, please feel to post comments on any of the essays, and I will do my best to acknowledge and respond to all of them. Others, of course, may join in the debate to the benefit, hopefully, of all in our quest for clarity and truth.  From time to time I will post essays on other topics.  All are fair game for critical discussion.

You can read my most recent post, "Philosophy, Laughter, and Humor" below.

Charles Marxer
Moderator
White Rock Philosophers' Cafe